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APOCALYPTIC VISIONS AND RESISTANCE TO SECULARIZATION
IN FINNISH FOLKLORE
In global terms, reactionary currents within Islam are today the most dramatic exam­
ples o f a self-conscious defense o f traditional values and practices under threat from 
secularizing forces. In historical terms, however, modernizing and secularizing proc­
esses were traumatic even for persons in those societies that we tend to think o f as 
smoothly and unproblematically secularized, such as modem Finland. In using the 
term ‘secularized’, I am not focusing on a decreased belief in God among individuals 
nor even on a decline in the social power o f religion such that diverse social sectors 
become increasingly independent from the domination o f religious meanings and insti­
tutions. (Berger -  Luckmann 1966. 74.; Martin 1978.; Dobbelaere 1987.; Stark 1999). 
Instead, I examine secularization from the grassroots level o f individual experience, as 
a a change in the way people talked about and viewed their universe, a change in 
which one conceptual currency was replaced by another.
In the first half o f the 19th century, rural Finnish inhabitants’ only access to 
broader visions o f the cosmos outside their own village or district was that provided 
by the Bible, Luther’s Catechism and occasional religious literature as well as Church 
hymnals and ministers’ sermons. When speaking, the agrarian folk drew widely upon 
these religious sources to describe their world, to speak from a position o f moral au­
thority, and to reinforce the credibility o f their arguments. For many Finns in the mid- 
19th century, earthly government was seen to ideally be a reflection o f God’s kingdom. 
God’s chosen rulers governed the secular realm, the clergy ruled the spiritual realm, 
and the family patriarch governed in his own household, all o f which reflected God’s 
divine rule in heaven. Within a relatively short period o f time, however, this entire 
symbolic and political order came tumbling down. The Christian discourses and refer­
ences to Scripture which farmers and labourers used to understand and explain the 
world became increasingly replaced by fundamentally new materialist and scientific 
discourses according to which the material world was an amoral series o f cause-and- 
effect relations, and constant change was to be expected in humans’ exploitation of it 
(Bruce 2002. 29). By the early decades o f the 20,h century, the assumption that every­
one shared a religiously-organized world view had all but disappeared from public 
discourse.
In this essay I examine how rural inhabitants reacted to the loss o f culturally 
dominant modes o f thought and behaviour. Rather than viewing secularism as the 
inevitable triumph o f rationality, many ordinary persons saw the shift to a secular so­
ciety as the abandonment o f a divine plan, the forsaking o f a promised Christian uto­
pia in which Christ would return in glory. Rural inhabitants viewed modern changes 
with suspicion and dismay, and the confusion they experienced was exacerbated by 
the fact that because modem changes occurred later in Finland than anywhere else in 
Western Europe, they also occurred more rapidly.
My sources are two bodies o f material housed in the Finnish Literature Soci­
ety (henceforth FLS) Folklore Archives in Helsinki. The first is ethnographic descrip­
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tions sent to the Archives in response to the questionnaire published in 1939 in the 
newspaper Kansatieto (Folk Knowledge) entitled “How did the common people react 
to new lifestyles?” These responses comprise 1435 pages o f rural inhabitants’ recol­
lections from the last decades o f the 19lh and first decades o f the 20th centuries (see 
Mikkola 2005, Mikkola forthcoming). The second body o f source materials used in 
this essay are approximately 280 folk narratives recorded between 1882 and 1961 
which deal with modern changes and what they were seen to portend. These folk nar­
ratives are classified under categories D 1401, 1411, 1441 and 1451 in Marjatta Jau- 
hiainen’s and Lauri Simonsuuri’s (1998) Type and Motif Index o f  Finnish Belief Le­
gends and Memórales.
SECULARIZATION IN 19™-CENTURY FINLAND
There is general agreement that countries in northwestern Europe seems to fit the 
paradigm o f secularization, but these are increasingly seen to be the exception to the 
rule, rather than the vanguard o f worldwide religious decline (Hadden 1995.; Davie 
2000.). With as little as 13% of the population attending church once per month,1 
Finland, along with other Scandinavian countries, is often cited as a good example o f a 
secularized society.2 The process o f secularization among ‘ordinary’ Finnish people is 
usually assumed to have occurred smoothly and untraumatically, rather than as having 
been the outcome o f an ideological struggle. This is because the reports o f seculariza­
tion which have come down to us were written by its ‘winners’: liberal middle-class 
educators and reformers. This socio-political group, which had the most to gain from 
secularization, controlled the public sphere o f the media in the last half o f the 19,h 
century, and it was therefore their views which tended to dominate public discussion. 
Using the new forums o f the emergent civic society -  the press and civic organizations 
-  as well as public schools, they lobbied for their own materialist world view to be­
come the authoritative language o f public life. But how did the common people in the 
countryside react to the rapid shift in discourses and practices they saw around them?
Ethnographic descriptions sent to the FLS Folklore Archives in response to 
the questionnaire entitled “How did the folk respond to new lifestyles?” suggest that in 
the 19th century, the older religious world view was reinforced by strict boundaries 
between objects, activities and discourses which were either “godly” or “worldly”. 
Comparative religions researcher Kati Mikkola argues that there was a vast gulf be­
tween divine and secular phenomenon in the popular imagination, and newly- 
introduced objects and ideas which had nothing to do with religion were seen to be 
sinful in and o f themselves. This was true not only among revivalist groups such as 
Pietists but also the rural population at large. For instance, the reading o f non-religious 
literature published for practical, educational, or entertaining purposes was seen to be
1 Harri Heino. 1993. ’The status of traditional religiosity in the Nordic countries” 
(http://www.evl.fi/kkh/ktk/norden.htm).
2 Naturally a decrease, even a dramatic one, in outward religious behaviors does not signal the 
disappearance of religion, nor, necessarily, even the straightforward decline of institutional 
religion. Roughly 90% of Finns belong to the state-supported Lutheran Church, and rites of 
baptism, confirmation, marriage and funerals organized by the Church are still important for 
many Finns.
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corrupting and a waste o f time (Mikkola 2005). Even newspapers could be regarded as 
polluting. One man from the western part o f Finland wrote that the older people did 
not allow newspapers near the Bible because the newspapers “could infect” .3 Some 
women from South Ostrobothnia considered it sinful that the same machine -  a radio -  
transmitted both church services and dance music (ibid: 32).4
Also regarded with suspicion and confusion was the secularization o f public 
events. At the first general elections in Finland in 1906, some older adults from east­
ern Finland arrived carrying hymnals. When they realized that there was to be no 
hymn-singing to mark this important collective occasion, they complained o f the 
world’s “ungodliness” (Mikkola 2005. 27).5 Until then, the primary events o f formal 
public life for many rural inhabitants had revolved around the Church. The concept of 
a collective arena that was both official and secular in nature seems to have been ex­
perienced by some persons as incomprehensible.
Objects and technologies perceived as inexplicable from a common sense 
point o f view were often interpreted as the Devil or the work o f the Devil. The bicycle 
was a good example o f a device w hich violated a number o f common sense notions 
about the way the world worked: first, it was balanced on only 2 wheels instead of 
four, and second it had nothing pulling it from the front. It was said o f the first cyclists 
that they must have sold their souls to the Devil, since otherwise they would not have 
been able to ride it (Mikkola 2005. 31).6 Photography, too, was thought to be a tool by 
which the Devil could steal a person’s soul (ibid: 30-31).7 A woman who saw an air­
plane for the first time in 1912 was sure that it was the Devil and that the world was 
coming to an end, bringing with it war, famine and plague (ibid: 31-32).8 Locomo­
tives were also seen to be the Devil himself, carrying whole “houses” behind him full 
o f people,9 10and rolling plows (rullaáes) made o f iron and wood which became more 
common at the end o f the 19'h century were called “field devils” . Some persons in 
southeast Finland were convinced that no God-given grain would ever grow in a field 
softened by a devil (ibid: 31)."’
These descriptions o f attitudes and beliefs suggest that for many, the only way 
that rural inhabitants could incorporate into their understanding the strange new phe­
nomena o f modem life was to use pre-existing models from the discourses available to 
them. In addition to ethnographic descriptions, local anecdotes and folktales recorded 
in rural Finland between 1885 and 1961 depict technological, social and environ­
mental changes in the narrators’ local surroundings as wonders seen by those with 
second sight -  folk narrators were said to have predicted beforehand, for instance, 
headless horses ridden by people, carriages flying through the air like birds, or swim­
ming under water like fish:' 1
3 Lansi-Teisko. 1939. Kalle Vesa E 150:295.
4 Alavus. 1939. Taimi Pitkámaki E 150:203.
5 Suomussalmi. Jaakko Hiltunen E 153:328.
6 Alavus. 1939. Senja Kaleva E 150:129.-Juho Raisio.
7 Koivisto. 1939. Ulla Mannonen E 152:302-306.
8 Koivisto. 1939. Ulla Mannonen E 152:242-244.
9 Koivisto. 1939. Ulla Mannonen E 152:275
10 Koivisto. 1939. Ulla Mannonen E 152:289-290.
11 Kokemaki. 1935-36. Emma Maenpáá KRK 62:265. -Niilo Ikola.
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Práttákitti predicted a lot o f things, for instance: that an iron horse would travel over 
Loimijoki River supported by iron runners, nor did it take many decades, because now 
there run many iron horses every day. This is quite remarkable because in those days 
no one knew anything about trains, not a single person from Loimaa knew even that 
such a device existed.
(Loimaa. 1937. HAKS6188).
Old Man Jussa from Ollila farm in Somero district had prophesied that when people 
become wiser and progress goes forward, then religion will be abandoned, and faith 
will give way to progress. There will come a time when people will travel under water 
like fishes and fly through the air like birds, and headless horses will travel on the 
roads and people will talk to each other over long distances. That’s what happened. 
Old Man Jussa lived at the end o f the 1700s and start o f the 1800s.
(Somero. 1938. Eeva Laato TK 53:104 -  Kustaa Lehtinen, b. 1879).
Ninety-one such folk narratives are housed in the FLS Folklore Archives. They were 
recorded from throughout Finland, and narrated by persons bom between 1841 and 
1899. They most likely functioned in rural communities as bits o f rumour or gossip 
that people might tell each other over coffee in the farmhouse or while working to­
gether in the fields.
Technology and modem innovations in these folktales are reinterpreted within 
a supernatural paradigm. They are portrayed not as the fruit o f scientific or material 
progress, but as something foreseen by a magic-worker, hermit, madman or a village 
fool. The “prophets” in these narratives were folk figures such as a vagabond named 
Kihovauhkonen ( Vihovauhkonen) or a female witch named Rattakitti (Práttákitti) 
whom each narrator assumed had lived at some time in the past in his own locality. 
Similar sorts o f prophesies are said to have been given by folk figures with names like 
Kirsperi, the King o f Tattara, Crazy Kallu, and even a clergyman from Ostrobothnia. 
More rarely, particular persons known to the narrator had repeated these prophesies as 
if they were their own.
These folktales tell us which changes received the most notice by ordinary 
people and were perceived to be the most wondrous or strange in their daily lives. 
Folk prophets were said to have predicted in advance the coming of automobiles, tele­
phone lines, electricity, radio waves, airplanes, submarines, bridges, hospitals and 
sanatoriums, glass windows, the smoking o f tobacco, store-bought clothing and even 
high-heeled shoes. By far the most frequently mentioned changes, however, were the 
coming o f railroads and the growth o f towns and human habitation in areas which had 
formerly been fields or wilderness. In twenty o f these folk narratives, modem changes 
are said to have heralded the end o f the world:
The older folk o f Lapua district believed that the end o f the world would come in time, 
and sought its omens. A certain minister o f Lapua said that it will come when people 
ride around on headless horses. Then, when people actually began to ride on such 
things through Lapua (first on trains, then in cars), the older people were o f the opin­
ion that the last days were approaching.
(Lapua. 1935-36. Vihtori Latvamaki KRK 182:251. -Juho Kujamaki, alias “Straw­
berry Jussi”).
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In (he 1800s, the master ofN uhi farm in Koljola village, Daavetti Nuhi, lived here. He 
studied the Bible intensely and prophesied accordingly. He had a detailed familiarity 
o f the Bible and predicted world events. He was also versed in law, and local inhabi­
tants always went to him to ask for advice in all kinds o f legal matters. I remember 
once when 1 was five years old, and I was with my father at Nuhi farm ( ...)  Juho Etu- 
Prami also came there, and there was a lot o f talk o f prophesying world events and the 
end o f the world. Juho talked, among other things, o f overpopulation and o f great wars 
which will start when headless horses travel from Jaffa to Jerusalem and people tly 
through the air. He predicted that in those days, people will begin to control the human 
birth rate with fine words and methods, but they will have mischief on their minds. 
Man is God’s image, it is not allowed to control his birth rate. Northern countries will 
get off easier, since in mischief-making as in other things, they lag behind those who 
are too clever for their own good. Half o f the world’s peoples will die in war, and the 
plague and hunger will take care o f the other half. Daavetti died, if  I remember rightly, 
in 1885.
(Nousiainen. 1949. Frans Leivo 3802).
In 35 folk tales, however, the modem objects and events believed to herald the end of 
the world were linked to a terrible bloodbath in which few men would be spared, in 
which the rivers would run with blood and “women will compete with each other to 
kiss men's feet and even the footprints where the men walked."'2 In an additional 18 
tales, modem changes were seen to directly predict this final battle (see Simonsuuri 
1950: 155):
...Thirty to forty years ago, on the basis o f old sources, perhaps from the times o f the 
monks, a copper smith named Stáhl predicted that after the town o f Rauma was encir­
cled by three different kinds o f iron bands, there would come a terrible war in which 
so much blood would run in the street gutters that people would have to wade through 
it up to their knees. When the railroad was built in Rauma in 1906, it was said to be 
the second iron band. The first was the network o f telegraph and telephone wires, and 
just now Rauma is being encircled by iron water pipes, so that the terrible prediction is 
about to come true. Iron bands in the air, on the ground, and inside the ground.
(Rauma. 1935-36. A. Limnell KRK 38:9).
Although some narrators interpreted the predictions o f the final battle to have meant 
the battles fought during the Finnish Civil War o f 1918 and the skirmishes which pre­
ceded it, others in the period 1930-61 reported that persons in their district were still 
waiting for the final battle to take place:
In Pyhajárvi in former times lived a highly remarkable man, who was called Ki- 
hovauhkonen (...) In those days when Kihovauhkonen lived hereabouts, there was 
only one house on Tikkalanniemi peninsula, Tikkala farm. But Kihovauhkonen said 
that someday there will be so many houses in Tikkalanniemi that a squirrel can circle 
the whole peninsula by jumping from roof to roof. And now in Tikkalanniemi (in Py- 
hasalmi) there are. Kihovauhkonen had predicted that an iron horse will at that time
1:1 Kokemáki. 1935-36. Emma Máenpáa KRK 62:265. -Niilo Ikola.
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travel over the straits, and that when that happens, the great war will come ( ...)  Many 
elderly persons around here still remember Kihovauhkonen and believe it will come 
true, just as the prediction concerning the iron horse has come true.
(Valtimo < Pyhájarvi. 1955. Siiri Oulasmaa 3095. -A . Leppisaari).
Near the city o f Sortavala along the road to Uukuniemi, on the lands o f the current 
pastor’s residence there used to be a small cottage ( ...)  In the cottage lived a hermit 
who had come from Russia and wore a long habit like monks do. Nobody visited the 
hut, but the old man sometimes visited his neighbors to say a few words. If he saw a 
nice man walking along the road, he waved his walking stick to stop the traveller and 
talked to him of remarkable prophesies. There was no city at that time. And he called 
himself Vihovauhkonen, so that no one would notice that he had escaped from Russia, 
perhaps for religious reasons. He predicted that in that place a city would be built and 
that its boundaries would lie just where they lie now. And then he said that Kisámáki 
church would be built, as it now has been. And then that a railroad would be built out­
side the city, along which an iron horse would snort. This has indeed happened and the 
railway runs outside the city. Then he said that people would fly through the air in 
machines that make a great buzzing noise. And finally will come such a massive war 
that a log will float in blood in the Lasalampi Pond near the church hill. All o f Vi- 
hovauhkonen’s prophesies have come true, but not yet the great war, which nonethe­
less can be expected, since a lot o f that sort o f thing is also prophesied in the Bible. 
(Mikkeli. 1937. Pekka Brofeldt KT 69:5).
One hundred and eighty-eight recorded examples o f apocalyptic narratives predicting 
a final terrible battle are housed in the FLS Folklore Archives. These narratives appear 
to represent an older tradition which was, starting in the mid-19th-century, combined 
with newer narratives regarding predictions o f modem change at a time these changes 
began to manifest themselves in rural inhabitants’ daily lives or were rumoured to 
exist. From the perspective o f Scripture, Christianity is an undeniably eschatological 
religion. Jesus himself is quoted as having discussed the end o f the world numerous 
times with his disciples:
Ye shalt hear o f wars and rumours o f wars. See that ye be not troubled; for it is neces­
sary for all this to be. But this is not the end: for nation shalt rise up against nation, 
and kingdom against kingdom, and there shalt be famines, plagues and earthquakes. 
(Matt. 24: 6-7).
Yet Finnish apocalyptic folk narratives were not modelled only on Biblical prophesies 
such as those in the book of Daniel and Revelations. They were also influenced by the 
16-page booklet “Prophecies o f the Sibyl” (Sibillan Ennustus Kirja, Prophetia Sibilla) 
dating back to Ancient Rome, o f which ten different printings were made in the Fin­
nish language in the 19lh century (Simonsuuri 1950: 151).
The fact that modem changes were interpreted in Finnish apocalyptic folk 
narratives as signs o f a final impending catastrophe provide some insight into how 
traumatic the processes o f modernization and secularization were for some rural in­
habitants. The fact that modem innovations were reinterpreted following eschatologi­
cal models from the Bible can also be seen as a defence o f the older rural world view
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against the increasingly secular discourses promoted by the educated middle classes. 
Within the sphere o f public discussion comprised by the 19th-century press and secular 
literature, religion was increasingly argued to have little or no authority over the mate­
rialist and scientific realm. But folk prophesies countered with the argument that even 
modern phenomena were merely the signs o f an apocalyptic ending ordained by God, 
ultimately understandable only within a religious master narrative.
What 1 suggest on the basis o f these examples from Finnish folklore is that the 
‘cultural protectionism’ implicit in all forms o f religious conservatism is not so much 
a defence o f traditional beliefs and values per se, but represents a struggle to resist 
cognitive dissonance and the disintegration o f prevailing meaning structures. Religion 
does not simply relate individuals to the supernatural: it relates them to the natural, the 
moral, and the communal, to understanding themselves, their activities, and their place 
in the physical and metaphysical cosmos. In many cultures, religious rhetoric and ar­
gumentation provide standards not just for evaluating the morality o f  information, but 
also the reliability o f  it. Secularization is thus more than the delegitimization o f reli­
gious beliefs: it is a breakdown in the accepted standards for truth evaluation and thus 
an entire way o f categorizing and engaging with the world. In order to better under­
stand expressions o f religious fundamentalism today, we must take a careful look at 
the history o f secularization processes in the West from the perspective o f those who 
were defeated in the struggle to define our fundamental visions o f reality, our core 
values and our common measures o f fact.
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